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Dear Ms. D'Alesandro: 
Re: State v. 
Case No. 
Kalmar 
970747-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 24(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Appellee Linda Kalmar cites the following supplemental 
authorities in support of her argument that strict compliance is 
required in order to incorporate a plea affidavit where the 
concern is whether the defendant was properly "advised of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea" as 
required by Rule 11(e) (7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1995) (trial 
court must engage in plea colloquy to ensure that 
requirements of Rule 11(e) are met) 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987) 
("Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that ... rule 11(e) requirements" are met; cannot 
assume that defense attorney made sure defendant understood 
contents of the affidavit) 
Ms. Julia D'Alesandro 
Page Two 
October 30, 1998 
State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988) 
("may not rely on defense counsel or executed affidavits to 
satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 11(e)") 
Judges Bench, Greenwood and Garff heard argument on this 
case on October 29, 1998. I would appreciate it if you would 
distribute this letter of supplemental authority to those judges 
at your earliest convenience. 
Sincerely, 
Joan C. Watt 
Attorney for Appellee 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
V. : 
LINDA A. KALMAR, : Case No. 970747-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over the state's appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . The state has 
the ability to appeal an order allowing withdrawal of a guilty 
plea pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (g) (Supp. 1997) . 
A copy of the "Order Allowing Defendant to Withdraw No contest 
Plea in Abeyance" which the state is appealing is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Whether the trial judge had the power to withdraw 
Appellee's plea of no contest prior to sentencing but more than 
thirty days after the plea hearing, where such plea was held in 
abeyance and Appellee was not informed of the thirty-day 
limitation for withdrawing pleas. 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of 
law which should be reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah App. 1997) (statutory 
interpretation and jurisdictional issues present questions of law 
which are reviewed for correctness). 
Preservation. The state argued in the trial court that a 
request to withdraw a no contest plea must be made within thirty 
days of the plea proceeding. R. 63. 
TEXT OF RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l (1995) provides: 
77-2a-l. Definitions. 
For purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by 
the court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of 
no contest from the defendant, but not, at that 
time, entering judgment of conviction against him 
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that 
he comply with specific conditions as set forth 
in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an 
agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and the defendant setting forth the specific 
terms and conditions upon which, following 
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea 
may be held in abeyance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2 (1995) provides in pertinent 
part: 
77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement--
Negotiation--Contents--Terms of agreement--Waiver 
of time for Sentencing. 
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea 
of guilty or no contest but prior to entry of 
judgment of conviction and imposition of 
sentence, the court may, upon motion of both the 
prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the 
plea in abeyance and not enter judgment of 
conviction against the defendant nor impose 
sentence upon the defendant within the time 
periods contained in Rule 22 (a) , Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3 (Supp. 1997) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea--Powers of court. 
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation 
of a plea in abeyance agreement shall be done in 
full compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may 
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provide that the court may, upon finding that the 
defendant has successfully completed the terms of 
the agreement: 
(a) reduce the degree of the offense 
and enter judgment of conviction and impose 
sentence for a lower degree of offense; or 
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's 
plea and order the dismissal of the case. 
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has 
successfully completed the terms of a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court shall reduce the 
degree of the offense, dismiss the case only as 
provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as 
agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a 
defendant for any lesser offense pursuant to a 
plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not 
invoke Section 76-3-402 to further reduce the 
degree of offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) provides: 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn 
at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may 
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest is made by motion and 
shall be made within 3 0 days after the entry 
of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the 
rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an 
infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in 
open court. The defendant shall not be required 
to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable 
time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, 
guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A 
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty 
or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a 
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant 
corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
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(c) A defendant may plead no contest only 
with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not 
guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for 
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be 
given a preference for an early trial. In cases 
other than felonies the court shall advise the 
defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea 
of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has 
found: 
(1) if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and 
does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right 
to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for 
the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the 
charged crime was actually committed by 
the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result 
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of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has 
been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of 
the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised 
that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on 
questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these 
factors after the court has established that 
the defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. 
If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that 
the affidavit has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute 
or rule, a court is not required to inquire 
into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, 
but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a 
plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the agreement 
shall be approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed 
by the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is 
not binding on the court. 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea 
discussions prior to any plea agreement being made 
by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement 
has been reached, the judge, upon request of 
the parties, may permit the disclosure of 
the tentative agreement and the reasons for 
it, in advance of the time for tender of the 
plea. The judge may then indicate to the 
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether the proposed disposition will be 
approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that 
final disposition should not be in 
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conformity with the plea agreement, the 
judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or 
withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of 
the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea 
of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, 
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the 
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any 
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on 
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea, 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of 
guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a 
hearing within a reasonable time to determine if 
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, 
or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest 
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not 
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for 
the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment 
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of 
the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has 
attached, order a commitment until the defendant 
is charged anew or retried, or may enter any 
other order as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated September 1, 1995, the state 
charged Defendant/Appellee LINDA A. KALMAR ("Appellee" or 
"Kalmar") with theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). R. 5-6. Appellee was booked and 
released to Pretrial Services on May 5, 1997. R. 2. 
On September 15, 1997, Appellee appeared before the 
Honorable David S. Young, Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
and pleaded no contest to attempted theft, a class A misdemeanor. 
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R. 52. That no contest plea was made pursuant to a plea in 
abeyance agreement between Appellee and the state. R. 46-50, 
26-27. A copy of the plea in abeyance agreement is in 
Addendum B; a copy of the Statement of Defendant ("Affidavit") is 
in Addendum C; a copy of the transcript of the September 15, 1997 
hearing is in Addendum D. 
On November 6, 1997, prior to sentencing and following 
off the record discussions between the parties and the judge, the 
trial judge allowed Appellee to withdraw her plea in abeyance. 
R. 60-66. The transcript of the November 6, 1997 hearing is in 
Addendum E. 
On November 24, 1997, the trial judge signed the "Order 
Allowing Defendant to Withdraw No contest Plea in Abeyance"; that 
order was filed on December 1, 1997. R. 31. See Addendum A. 
The state filed its Notice of Appeal on December 5, 1997. R. 33. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Appellee was employed by Cook's Books. R. 54-55, 61. 
She did not receive a salary; instead, she received a commission 
based on a percentage of book sales that she made. R. 55. 
In August 1994, Kalmar submitted her resignation. R. 55. 
At that time, Kalmar had outstanding commissions for which she 
was still receiving money. R. 55. 
People who had purchased books from Kalmar sent checks 
1
 Because the case did not go to trial, evidence was not 
introduced. The fact statements in Appellee's and Appellant's 
briefs are based on statements in the Information, the plea 
affidavit and the plea in abeyance agreement as well as statements 
made during the plea and restitution hearings. 
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directly to her. R. 55. Believing that Kalmar had the money 
coming to her for commissions, Kalmar and/or her sister deposited 
three checks from clients directly into Kalmar's account. R. 55. 
The three checks totaled $1,530.28. R. 26. 
It is not clear from the record whether Kalmar was due 
$1,530.28 in outstanding commissions or whether the amount was 
actually more or less than that. At the restitution hearing 
during which the judge withdrew Kalmar's plea, the judge 
indicated that during off the record discussions, he had been 
told that the company sent some correspondence which "indicated 
that in fact the net obligation after they offset the commissions 
they owed her and the money that she owed them, and so on, was 
something like $687... ." R. 61. That correspondence is not in 
the record and the judge did not take evidence as to Kalmar's 
position in regard to any possible restitution.2 Additionally, 
2
 The state incorrectly claims in its brief that "[a]t the 
restitution hearing, defendant represented to the court that after 
offsetting the monies owed her by her former employer, she owed the 
company $687.00 in restitution (R. 61)." State's brief at 5 
(footnote omitted). The record actually shows that the trial judge 
indicated that in an off the record discussion, he had been shown 
correspondence in which Cook's Books claimed $687 in restitution. 
Defense counsel stated that the trial judge's recitation of the off 
the record discussion and the judge's statement that the amount 
claimed by Cook's Books in the letter "was something like $687 
dollars" was "pretty close." R. 61; see Addendum E containing 
R. 61-62. The record does not support the state's claim in its 
fact statement that it was Kalmar's position that she owed $687 in 
restitution. Indeed, Kalmar's position throughout these 
proceedings has been that she did not owe any restitution. See 
R. 47-49, 54-55, 61-62 in Addenda D and E. Moreover, Kalmar did 
not make any statement admitting or even suggesting that she owed 
Cook's Books any restitution. See State v. Galli, Case Nos. 
960018, 960122, 960123, slip op. at 12 (Utah 1998)(statement by 
attorney in restitution hearing does not constitute admission by 
defendant). 
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the judge recognized that there was "the difficulty of 
determining restitution." R. 60-61. The judge did not make a 
finding as to the amount of restitution, if any, Kalmar owed 
Cook's Books. 
On September 15, 1997, Kalmar pleaded no contest to a 
class A misdemeanor attempted theft, with that plea to be held in 
abeyance on the terms contained in the plea in abeyance 
agreement. R. 52, 26-27. Pursuant to the plea in abeyance 
agreement, if the trial judge found after a restitution hearing 
that Cook's Books owed Kalmar $1,530.28 or more, Kalmar could 
withdraw her plea in abeyance and the case would be dismissed six 
months after the plea hearing. R. 26-2 7; see Addendum B. If the 
judge found that the commissions due Kalmar were less than 
$1,530.28 and that Kalmar therefore owed restitution, Kalmar 
could withdraw her plea in abeyance and have the case dismissed 
after she paid such restitution. R. 27. 
At the plea proceeding, the trial judge was initially 
concerned with whether a restitution hearing ought to be held 
prior to his acceptance of a plea from Kalmar. R. 47-49. 
Thereafter, the trial judge conducted "an abbreviated colloquy." 
R. 55.3 Although there was a plea affidavit, the judge did not 
3
 The trial judge, who is experienced and thorough, and who 
has conducted numerous plea colloquys during his years on the 
bench, appears to have intentionally not followed the dictates of 
Rule 11, perhaps due to his concern as to whether this matter was 
criminal in nature. Prior to the colloquy, the trial judge asked 
the prosecutor, "[i]f you went through the evidence and found out 
that, indeed, [Cook's Books] owed her money, you wouldn't want to 
prosecute her?" The prosecutor responded, "Right," and went on to 
say that if it turned out that Kalmar did not owe money, the state 
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ask Kalmar whether she had read, understood and acknowledged the 
affidavit. R. 46-56; see "Statement of Defendant" ("Affidavit") 
in Addendum C. Instead, the colloquy was limited to asking 
whether Kalmar (1) understood that the no contest plea would be 
treated as an admission of guilt if the judge later had to review 
the matter, (2) understood that she was waiving her right to a 
trial, the requirement that the state call witnesses, and her 
right to silence, (3) was satisfied with the advice of defense 
counsel, and (4) was under the influence of any drug, alcohol, 
narcotic, or anything which would impair her judgment. R. 50-51. 
The judge did not discuss the elements of the crime, the facts as 
they related to those elements or the thirty-day limit for 
withdrawing pleas, among other things. 
After Kalmar pleaded no contest and the court scheduled a 
restitution hearing, defense counsel asked the court, "[s]hall we 
execute this?" R. 54. The judge then directed Kalmar to sign 
the Affidavit. R. 54. No other discussion regarding the plea 
Affidavit occurred. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge asked defense 
counsel whether he "wanted to say something more about the facts 
and elements." R. 54. Defense counsel responded: 
Defense counsel: The issue is, she put in her 
would "essentially dismiss the case," but that he didn't think that 
was "the way it's going to come down." R. 49. The judge then 
asked whether the state had any objections to holding the 
evidentiary hearing prior to taking the plea. R. 49. Although the 
plea was ultimately taken, this exchange evidences concern by the 
judge prior to the plea colloquy as to whether this case involved 
a criminal matter. 
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resignation for her employment, and at the time 
she put in her resignation she still had some 
money coming on commissions. She didn't receive 
a salary; she got a percentage of all book 
sales. She made sixteen percent. And the 
resignation--the letter of resignation was in 
August of '94, and so terminated her employment 
at that time. 
R. 54-55. This is the only discussion regarding the "facts and 
elements." R. 54. 
A few days before the November 6, 1997 hearing, the 
parties and judge had an off the record discussion during which 
they apparently agreed to withdraw the plea and set the matter 
for trial. R. 60. At the November 6, 1997 hearing, the judge 
made a record of that discussion, indicating that there was 
difficulty determining restitution and that the matter appeared 
to be an accounting dispute which should be settled in civil 
court. R. 62. The state argued that the time for withdrawing 
the plea had passed. R. 63. The trial court stated that there 
was "good cause for allowing the plea to be withdrawn," denied 
the state's objection and allowed the plea to be withdrawn. 
R. 64. On December 1, 1997, the trial court entered the "Order 
Allowing Defendant to Withdraw No contest Plea in Abeyance" which 
stated, 
Pursuant to the defendant's motion, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that her plea in abeyance to a 
Class A Theft that was entered on September 15, 
1997 is withdrawn. After reviewing the material 
and discussing the matter with Ernie Jones, 
Deputy District Attorney and defendant's 
attorney, Lynn R. Brown, the Court on the motion 
of the defendant terminates the plea in abeyance 
and declines to enter judgment against her. 
R. 31. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial judge correctly concluded that he had the 
authority to allow withdrawal of Kalmar's plea in abeyance. 
Three distinct bases for this authority exist. 
First, the thirty-day limitation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6(2) (b) (1995) is not triggered unless the defendant is 
informed of the thirty-day limitation on withdrawing pleas during 
the plea proceedings. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
appears to require that the trial judge explicitly inform the 
defendant of this limitation during the colloquy. The trial 
judge did not mention the thirty-day limitation during the plea 
colloquy in this case. 
Even if a statement in the plea affidavit would suffice 
to inform the defendant of the thirty-day limitation, the plea 
affidavit must be properly incorporated in order to rely on the 
affidavit as the basis for establishing that the defendant was 
informed of the thirty-day rule. In this case, the Affidavit was 
not incorporated into the record since (1) the trial judge did 
not ascertain that Kalmar had read, understood and acknowledged 
the Affidavit, and (2) the trial judge did not clarify 
ambiguities created by the Affidavit and the plea in abeyance 
agreement which allowed Kalmar to later withdraw her plea without 
any time limitations. Because the Affidavit was not incorporated 
and the judge did not mention the thirty-day limitation during 
the colloquy, the jurisdictional nature of the thirty-day 
limitation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) was not triggered in this 
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case. 
Second, Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows 
a trial judge to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea at any time 
prior to imposition of sentence. That rule explicitly states 
that a trial judge may arrest judgment "[a]t any time prior to 
the imposition of sentence ... if the facts ... admitted do not 
constitute a public offense ... or there is other good cause for 
the arrest of judgment." In this case, the trial judge properly 
arrested judgment based on his determination that the matter was 
civil in nature and did not constitute a crime. In addition, the 
trial judge properly arrested judgment based on the noncompliance 
with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking the 
plea. 
Third, a plea in abeyance is not "entered" until after 
the conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement and only if the 
defendant does not meet the conditions of the plea in abeyance 
agreement. The plea in abeyance agreement in this case 
contemplated that Kalmar's no contest plea was not "entered" at 
the plea proceeding so as to trigger the thirty-day rule of 
section 77-13-6(2)(b) since the plea in abeyance agreement 
contemplated that Kalmar would withdraw her plea in abeyance more 
than thirty days after the plea proceeding. Because the plea in 
abeyance was not entered, the thirty-day limitation of section 
77-13-6(2)(b) did not deprive the judge of jurisdiction. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE HAD JURISDICTION TO 
WITHDRAW APPELLEE'S NO CONTEST PLEA IN ABEYANCE. 
The state has not challenged the substance of the trial 
judge's ruling that the plea should be withdrawn.4 The only 
issue raised by the state and therefore the only issue which is 
properly before this Court is the question of whether the trial 
judge had jurisdiction to withdraw the plea of no contest which 
had been held in abeyance. 
The trial judge had jurisdiction to withdraw the plea 
since (1) Appellee was not informed of the thirty-day limitation 
where the judge did not refer to that limitation during the plea 
colloquy and did not incorporate the plea Affidavit into the 
colloquy; hence, the thirty-day limitation was not triggered in 
this case; (2) a trial judge can properly arrest judgment at any 
time prior to imposition of sentence pursuant to Rule 23, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (3) a plea in abeyance is not 
subject to the thirty-day limitation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(2)(b) (1995). 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE HAD JURISDICTION TO WITHDRAW 
THE PLEA SINCE APPELLEE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE 
THIRTY-DAY LIMITATION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) states in part: 
4
 As set forth infra at 25-30, the trial judge had good cause 
to withdraw the plea since there was not strict compliance with 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking the plea, and 
a factual basis for the plea did not exist due to the lack of 
criminal intent. The trial judge's determination that this matter 
involved a civil accounting dispute rather than a crime established 
good cause for withdrawing the plea. 
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(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest is made by motion and shall be made 
within 3 0 days after the entry of the plea. 
Although this Court held in State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578 
(Utah App. 1992) that the thirty-day limitation in section 77-13-
6(2)(b) is jurisdictional and runs from the date of the plea 
proceeding, the "jurisdictional nature" of the statute is not 
triggered unless the defendant is informed of the thirty-day 
limitation at the time the plea is taken. See Price, 837 P.2d at 
582. This Court reached its decision that the jurisdictional 
limit does not apply unless the defendant is informed of the 
thirty-day limitation by construing section 77-13-6(2)(b) "in 
conjunction with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." Price, 837 P.2d at 582. 
Rule 11(5) (g) states: "The court may refuse to 
accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found ... 
the defendant has been advised of the time limits 
for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest." Rule 11(6) provides: 
"Failure to advise the defendant of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea 
of guilty or no contest is not a ground for 
setting the plea aside, but may be ground for 
extending the time to make a motion under Section 
77-13-6." Therefore, although the language of 
Section 77-13-6(2) (b) is unconditional, it is 
subject to an exception incorporated within 
Rule 11. 
Price, 837 P.2d at 582. 
Requiring that the defendant be informed of the thirty-
day rule in order to trigger the jurisdictional nature of section 
77-13-6(2)(b) squares with this Court's prior decisions regarding 
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application of that section. See Price, 837 P.2d at 583 
(discussing State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991), cert. 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) and State v. Ouintana, 826 P.2d 
1068 (Utah App. 1991)) . This Court explained in Price that the 
defendants in Smith and Quintana were not informed of the thirty-
day limitation since they pleaded guilty before section 77-13-6 
was amended to include that limitation. The determination in 
those cases that the thirty-day limitation did not deprive the 
trial judge of jurisdiction was therefore correct. 
Rule 11 and case law governing the validity of guilty 
pleas provide guidance in determining whether Kalmar was 
"informed" of the thirty-day limitation, thereby triggering the 
jurisdictional nature of that provision. See, e.g., State v. 
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Utah 1991). Rule 11(e) lists the 
findings to be made by a trial judge prior to accepting a guilty 
plea. It provides that "[tjhese findings may be based on 
questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, an 
affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the affidavit." Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (emphasis added). 
Utah case law requires strict compliance with Rule 11 in 
the taking of guilty pleas, and allows reliance on information in 
the plea affidavits only where the affidavit is properly 
incorporated "when the trial judge ascertains in the plea 
colloquy that the defendant has read, has understood, and 
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acknowledges all the information contained [in the affidavit]." 
Macruire, 830 P.2d at 217; see also Smith, 812 P.2d at 477. In 
Smith, quoted favorably in Macruire, this Court looked to the 
affidavit in determining whether there was strict compliance with 
Rule 11 only because "the trial court carefully reviewed 
appellant's plea affidavit with appellant during the plea 
colloquy, and then incorporated the affidavit into the record of 
the plea hearing." Smith, 812 P.2d at 476. This Court 
emphasized: 
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11 
compliance be demonstrated on the record at the 
time the guilty or no contest plea is entered, 
rstate v.1 Gibbons, 740 P.2d [1309 (Utah 1987)] 
at 1313 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 470, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1172, 22 L.Ed.2d 
418 (1969)). Therefore, if an affidavit is used 
to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed 
during the plea hearing. Jd. at 1314. The trial 
court must conduct an inquiry to establish that 
the defendant understands the affidavit and 
voluntarily signed it. The inquiry cannot stop 
there, however. ... Any omissions or ambiguities 
in the affidavit must be clarified during the 
plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in 
the course of the plea colloquy. Then the 
affidavit itself, signed by the required parties, 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313, can be incorporated 
into the record. 
Smith, 812 P.2d at 477. Hence, in order to consider an affidavit 
when determining whether a defendant was informed of the thirty-
day limitation, the trial judge must address the affidavit during 
the colloquy and inquire whether the defendant understands and 
voluntarily signed the affidavit. 
Additionally, Rule 11(f) indicates that "[f]ailure to 
advise the defendant of the time limits" (emphasis added) for 
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moving to withdraw a plea may be grounds for extending the time 
for filing such a motion. Use of the word "advise" suggests that 
even if the thirty-day rule is outlined in a properly 
incorporated affidavit, the trial judge must advise the defendant 
of the limitation during the colloquy. 
In the present case, the trial judge did not inform 
Kalmar during the colloquy that she must move to withdraw her 
plea of no contest within thirty days or lose the opportunity to 
do so. Pursuant to subsection (f) of Rule 11, the lack of such 
information during the colloquy provided a basis for extending 
the thirty days, and defeated the jurisdictional nature of the 
statute. 
In addition, even if such information in the Affidavit 
would suffice to "advise" the defendant of the limitation, the 
jurisdictional nature of the thirty-day limitation was triggered 
only if the trial judge ascertained that Kalmar had read, 
understood and acknowledged the Affidavit. See Smith, 812 P.2d 
at 477; Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217; Price, 837 P.2d at 582; 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Although paragraph 14 refers to the thirty-day rule, the 
trial judge did not ascertain that Kalmar had read, understood 
and acknowledged the Affidavit, and the Affidavit therefore was 
not incorporated into the plea colloquy. The only reference to 
the Affidavit during the colloquy was when the judge told Kalmar 
to sign the Affidavit after defense counsel inquired whether they 
should execute it. R. 54. This direction from the judge that 
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Kalmar sign the Affidavit is not sufficient under Maguire and 
Smith to establish that Kalmar read, understood and assented to 
the contents of the Affidavit. 
Nor does the recitation in the Certificate of Attorney 
which is attached to the Affidavit meet the Rule 11(e) and case 
law requirement that the trial judge ascertain during the 
colloquy that the defendant has read, understood and acknowledges 
the contents of the affidavit. See Smith, 812 P.2d at 477. 
Counsel's discussions with a defendant and belief that the 
defendant understands is not a substitute for the requirement 
that during the plea hearing, the trial judge "must conduct an 
inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the affidavit 
and voluntarily signed it." See id.; see also Maguire, 83 0 P.2d 
at 217 (citing Smith, 812 P.2d at 470). In this case where the 
trial judge did not conduct such an inquiry, strict compliance 
with Rule 11 is not demonstrated. 
Moreover, the Affidavit was not incorporated since 
ambiguities as to the application of the thirty-day limitation in 
this case were not clarified during the colloquy. Although the 
Affidavit indicated that the plea could be withdrawn only if a 
motion were filed within thirty days "after the entry of [the] 
plea," the plea in abeyance agreement anticipated withdrawal of 
the plea after the restitution hearing, which was scheduled for 
more than thirty days after the plea proceedings. In other 
words, although the Affidavit stated that a plea must be 
withdrawn within thirty days of entry of the plea, the plea in 
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abeyance agreement contemplated withdrawing the plea more than 
thirty days after the plea proceedings. The term "entry of plea" 
was not defined for Kalmar and she could have reasonably 
understood that "entry of the plea" would not occur until after 
the conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement. It is not 
clear when the Affidavit is considered in conjunction with the 
plea in abeyance agreement, whether the thirty days began to run 
at the time of the plea proceeding or only after unsuccessful 
conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement.5 
Smith instructs that "[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in 
the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing" in order 
to incorporate the affidavit. Smith, 812 P.2d at 477. Hence, 
the Affidavit was not properly incorporated for two reasons: (1) 
the judge did not ascertain that Kalmar had read, understood and 
acknowledged the Affidavit, and (2) the judge did not clarify the 
ambiguities created by the inconsistency between the plea 
Affidavit and the plea in abeyance agreement. 
The jurisdictional nature of section 77-13-6(2) (b) was 
not triggered in this case where the trial judge did not (1) 
advise Kalmar of the thirty-day limitation during the colloquy, 
(2) incorporate the Affidavit into the hearing and (3) clarify 
ambiguities in the Affidavit which were created by the plea in 
abeyance agreement. Since the jurisdictional nature of the 
thirty-day limitation was not triggered, the trial judge had the 
5
 Conviction would be entered in this case only if Kalmar 
unsuccessfully completed the plea in abeyance agreement; see 
discussion infra at 31-32. 
20 
authority to withdraw the plea.6 
B. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY ARRESTED JUDGMENT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 23, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE. 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
At any time prior to imposition of sentence, the 
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion 
of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the 
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a 
public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, 
or there is other good cause for the arrest of 
j udgment. ... 
(emphasis added). The plain language of this rule allows a trial 
judge to arrest judgment where a defendant has pled guilty at any 
time prior to imposition of sentence. While facts are "proved" 
at a trial, they are "admitted" when a defendant pleads guilty or 
no contest. The inclusion of the words "or admitted" clarifies 
that a judge has the ability to arrest judgment after a defendant 
has pled guilty or no contest and prior to sentencing where good 
cause exists for such arrest of judgment.7 
6
 In order for the state to establish that the trial judge 
lacked jurisdiction under Section 77-13-6(2) (b) , it must establish 
that the defendant was informed of the limitation. Although 
Appellee did not explicitly argue that the jurisdictional nature of 
the statute was not triggered, that argument was implicit in the 
proceedings below. Moreover, this Court can affirm on any 
reasonable legal grounds which are apparent in the record. See 
State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997) (appellate 
court can affirm on grounds which are "apparent on the record"). 
7
 Although the parties did not refer to Rule 23, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure during argument, the order being appealed 
reads as if it were an order arresting judgment. The judge based 
his ruling on his refusal to sentence or enter judgment against 
Kalmar because he did not believe a crime had been committed. 
Moreover, this Court can properly affirm the order on this legal 
basis regardless of whether it was raised below since the record 
supports such affirmance. See Montoya, 937 P. 2d at 149 (citing 
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 
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Allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any 
time prior to sentencing harmonizes with the other statutes and 
rules that control criminal proceedings. A criminal case is 
initiated by the filing of an Information. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-2-2 (1995) . After the criminal matter is commenced by the 
filing of an Information, the district court has jurisdiction 
over the matter until entry of a final order dismissing the case 
or final judgment of conviction.8 In order to sentence a 
1969)) (appellate court will affirm judgment on any proper legal 
ground which is apparent on the record). 
8
 Pursuant to statute and rules, district court judges have 
limited authority to act in criminal cases following judgment of 
conviction. For example, a notice of appeal is filed in the trial 
court within thirty days after judgment. Rule 4, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. A trial judge has the power to enter an order 
extending the time for filing a notice of appeal for up to thirty 
days after the notice is originally due. Id. Additionally, a 
trial judge can entertain a motion for new trial if that motion is 
filed within ten days after judgment. Rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
In Price, this Court assumed that "entry of the plea" 
occurred during the plea proceeding, without considering 
alternative meanings for that term. See Price, 837 P. 2d at 582-83. 
The term "entry of the plea" is ambiguous, however, in that it 
could refer to the time at which the defendant "enters a plea" by 
stating "no contest" or "guilty" on the record, or it could refer 
to the later time at which the trial judge enters the plea in the 
court record as a judgment of conviction. 
Construing the term to mean the time at which the trial 
judge enters the plea as a judgment of conviction would harmonize 
with other rules and statutes. A defendant would have thirty days 
after entry of judgment to either file a notice of appeal or motion 
to withdraw. Trial judges with jurisdiction over a criminal case 
would not be deprived of the authority to withdraw a plea, while 
maintaining the power to oversee all other matters relevant to the 
case. 
Support for construing section § 77-13-6(2)(b) to allow 
thirty days to withdraw a plea following entry of judgment of 
conviction is found in the legislative history of the statute. 
Senator Carling, who sponsored the senate bill, informed the 
legislators that the bill was designed to prevent defendants from 
returning to court four or five years down the road and asking to 
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defendant, a trial judge must be convinced that there is a legal 
basis for doing so. Indeed, at sentencing proceedings, trial 
judges almost universally inquire as to whether there is a legal 
reason not to sentence a defendant. A legal reason not to 
sentence a defendant certainly includes the existence of an 
illegal plea. 
In addition, sentencing often occurs more than thirty 
days after a plea is entered. The trial judge's power to arrest 
judgment ensures that prosecutors follow through on sentencing 
recommendations and other provisions of plea agreements. Since 
withdraw pleas after evidence had been lost. The senator 
indicated, "this bill has been presented which would indicate that 
a person may withdraw their guilty plea only within 3 0 days after 
they entered that plea and there has been a final disposition. . . . " 
See Addendum F containing comments by Senator Carling to the Utah 
State Senate. The legislative history does not suggest the intent 
to limit the authority of a trial judge to withdraw pleas where the 
judge otherwise has jurisdiction over a criminal case and has not 
yet sentenced the defendant. 
While there is support for the Price interpretation that 
the thirty days begin to run at the plea proceeding, the efficient 
administration of a criminal case requires that a trial judge who 
finds good cause for withdrawing a plea prior to sentencing have 
the authority to do so. Moreover, this Court reached its decision 
in Price by comparing motions to withdraw guilty pleas with filing 
provisions for notices of appeal and petitions for writ of 
certiorari. Such filings are distinct from motions to withdraw 
pleas since they create jurisdiction which does not otherwise 
exist. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure creates appellate 
jurisdiction only if the notice is timely filed; likewise, Rule 47, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows for certiorari 
jurisdiction only if the petition is timely filed. By contrast, 
the Price interpretation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) takes away power 
to withdraw pleas in cases where a trial judge otherwise has 
jurisdiction over the case. 
This Court need not reconsider its conclusion in Price that 
the thirty days begin to run at the plea proceeding, however, since 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides an alternative 
grant of authority to a trial judge to arrest judgment prior to 
imposition of sentence. 
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failure to comply with a plea agreement can be grounds for 
withdrawal of the plea (see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 
(1971); State v. Gladnev, 951 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1998)), it 
follows that a trial judge has the power to allow a defendant to 
withdraw a plea at any time prior to sentencing in order to 
provide a procedure for withdrawal to defendants where sentencing 
is scheduled more than thirty days after the plea proceeding.9 
Rule 23 provides this power to the trial judge. 
Moreover, where there is basis for withdrawing a plea, a 
defendant can proceed under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3) . Since a defendant 
can withdraw an illegal plea at any time under Rule 65B, the 
efficient administration of justice requires that a trial judge 
who has jurisdiction over a case and who finds good cause to 
withdraw the plea be able to do so prior to sentencing. An 
unnecessary waste of resources would occur if defendants who 
enter involuntary or otherwise illegal pleas and decide to 
withdraw such pleas prior to sentencing were not allowed to do so 
pursuant to Rule 23. The plain language of Rule 23, along with 
the trial judge's continued jurisdiction over the criminal case, 
give the judge the authority to allow withdrawal of a plea at any 
time prior to sentencing where good cause for such withdrawal 
exists. The efficient administration of justice along with 
Rule 23 require that a trial judge have the power to withdraw a 
9
 In most felony cases, sentencing occurs more than thirty 
days after the plea proceeding in order to allow Adult Probation 
and Parole time to prepare a presentence report. 
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bad plea prior to sentencing even if more than thirty days has 
passed from the plea hearing. 
Good cause existed in this case to arrest judgment since 
the judge did not comply with Rule 11 in accepting the plea and 
the facts did not indicate that a crime had been committed. 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in part: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea 
of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has 
found: 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right 
to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for 
the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the 
charged crime was actually committed by 
the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result 
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of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has 
been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of 
the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised 
that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on 
questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these 
factors after the court has established that 
the defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. 
Where the trial judge does not strictly comply with 
Rule 11, withdrawal of the plea is the appropriate remedy. See 
Smith, 812 P.2d at 476. As set forth supra at 16-18, strict 
compliance with Rule 11 must be demonstrated on the record by 
either questioning of the defendant during the colloquy or by 
proper incorporation of an affidavit at the colloquy. See 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Smith, 812 P.2d at 
476-77. An affidavit is properly incorporated only "when the 
trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant 
has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information 
contained [in the affidavit]." Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; Macruire, 830 P. 2d at 217. 
In this case, the trial judge did not strictly comply 
with Rule 11 at the plea hearing. First, the judge did not make 
any findings as required by the rule; nor did he state that he 
accepted Kalmar's plea. R. 51-53. Specifically, the judge did 
not find that the plea was voluntary, that Kalmar knew her 
constitutional rights and waived those rights, that she 
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understood the elements and that the state would be required to 
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a 
factual basis for the plea, that Kalmar had been advised of the 
thirty-day limit for withdrawal of a plea, or that Kalmar had 
been advised that her right to appeal was limited. Failure to 
make these findings constitutes noncompliance with Rule 11, 
demonstrating good cause for arrest of judgment. See Smith, 812 
P.2d at 476. 
In addition to not making the required findings, during 
the colloquy, the court did not inform Kalmar of several of the 
items required by Rule 11. The trial judge did not fully inform 
Kalmar of the rights she was waiving. Instead, he told Kalmar 
that she was waiving her "rights to trial" and outlined only some 
of those rights. R. 51. 
Trial judge: If I accept your plea to no contest 
on this case, you're waiving all of your rights 
to trial. That means from this point on, there 
would be no trial. The state would not be ! 
obligated to call witnesses to testify against 
you, you would waive your rights of silence, and 
acknowledge at least what happened here, so that 
we could get to the evidentiary hearing. Do you 
understand that? 
R. 51. The trial judge did not specify that Kalmar enjoyed a 
presumption of innocence, that the state would otherwise be 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed 
the crime, that she had the right to have a jury decide whether 
she was guilty, that she had a right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses or that she had the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses. See Rule 11(e) (3) . 
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During the colloquy, the trial judge also did not discuss 
the nature or elements of the offense. While he informed Kalmar 
that she would be pleading to attempted theft, a class A 
misdemeanor and the potential sentence for that offense, the 
trial judge did not outline the elements that the state would 
have to prove to convict her of that charge. R. 52. 
Nor does the transcript of the plea proceeding 
demonstrate a factual basis for the plea. The prosecutor's 
initial statement does not cover the factual basis for the plea. 
See R. 47-8. After Kalmar pleaded no contest, defense counsel 
stated: 
Defense counsel: The issue is, she put in her 
resignation for employment, and at the time she 
put in her resignation she still had some money 
coming on her commissions. She didn't receive a 
salary; she got a percentage on all book sales. 
She made sixteen percent. And the resignation--
the letter of resignation was in August of '94, 
and so terminated her employment at that time. 
And after she terminated her employment, 
checks came to her directly from the people that 
she sold the books to. So she endorsed the 
checks and deposited them in her bank account. 
Actually, I think her sister did on two of 
them. But she felt that she had money coming, 
and that was the issue. 
R. 54-5. This passage coupled with the remainder of the colloquy 
fails to establish that Kalmar actually committed the crime of 
attempted theft or that the state had "sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial risk of conviction." Rule 11(e) (4) (B) . 
Indeed, nothing suggests criminal intent on Kalmar's part, a 
necessary element of the crime. Hence, the colloquy does not 
demonstrate that "there is a factual basis for the plea." 
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Rule 11(e)(4)(B). 
The colloquy also does not outline all of the details of 
the plea in abeyance agreement nor include questioning by the 
judge to ascertain that Kalmar understood and agreed to the terms 
of the agreement. Hence, there was not strict compliance with 
subsection (6) of Rule 11(e). 
Finally, the colloquy does not indicate that the trial 
judge advised Kalmar during the hearing of the time limits for 
filing a motion to withdraw plea or that her right to appeal 
would be limited by the plea. The colloquy therefore fails to 
demonstrate strict compliance with the requirements of 
subsections 7 and 8 of Rule 11. 
Since the trial judge did not ascertain during the 
colloquy that Kalmar had read and understood the Affidavit and 
acknowledged all of the information in the Affidavit, the 
Affidavit was not incorporated into the record. See Maguire, 83 0 
P.2d at 217; Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Because the Affidavit was not incorporated, strict compliance 
with Rule 11 must be demonstrated during the colloquy. In this 
case where the colloquy does not demonstrate strict compliance 
with Rule 11 requirements, the trial judge had good cause to 
arrest j udgment. 
Additionally, even if the Affidavit were considered, the 
Affidavit fails to demonstrate a factual basis for the plea, as 
that term is defined in Rule 11(e)(4)(B). Pursuant to Rule 
11(e)(4)(B), "[a] factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
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that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction." 
Under the elements section of the Affidavit, the 
following handwritten paragraph appears: 
On 8-10-94 [through] 9-7-94 the defendant, a 
party to the offense attempted to exercise 
unauthorized control over the property of Cooks 
Books with the purpose to deprive the owner and 
the value exceeded 1,000 but less than $5,00 0. 
R. 19. In the section of the Affidavit where the factual basis 
for the plea is to be included, the handwritten phrase "same as 
elements" appears. R. 19. 
These portions of the Affidavit coupled with the plea 
colloquy fail to demonstrate that Kalmar committed the crime of 
attempted theft or that there was sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk that she would be convicted of that 
crime. Indeed, the Affidavit adds nothing regarding the factual 
basis of the plea, and the limited recitation of the facts during 
the colloquy suggests that Kalmar lacked the required "purpose to 
deprive" and that her control over the money might not have been 
unauthorized. 
In this case where the plea was not accepted in strict 
compliance with Rule 11, a factual basis for the plea did not 
exist, and there was no showing of criminal intent, the trial 
judge had good cause to arrest judgment. 
C. A PLEA IN ABEYANCE IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
THIRTY-DAY LIMITATION OF SECTION 77-13-6(2) (b) . 
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A plea in abeyance contemplates that any such plea which 
is accepted by a trial judge will not be entered as a conviction 
unless and until the plea in abeyance agreement is violated. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-l through 4 outline the requirements for 
pleas in abeyance. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l provides in part: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a 
court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or 
no contest from the defendant but not, at that 
time, entering judgment of conviction against him 
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that 
he comply with specific conditions set forth in a 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
This section clarifies that a trial judge "accepts" a plea in 
abeyance but does not enter judgment of conviction nor impose 
sentence for such pleas. Hence, a plea in abeyance is not 
"entered" at the plea hearing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(l) further clarifies that while 
a judge "accepts" a plea in abeyance, he treats that plea 
differently than a regular guilty or no contest plea since he 
holds the plea in abeyance and does not enter it as a judgment of 
conviction. The plea in abeyance statutes contemplate that in 
many cases, a plea will be withdrawn after the defendant 
successfully completes the agreement, and the charge dismissed. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3 (Supp. 1997). In most cases, this 
withdrawal of the plea will occur more than thirty days after the 
plea hearing. Hence, while pleas in abeyance are "accepted," 
they are not "entered" as are regular pleas. The requirement of 
section 77-13-6(2)(b) that a defendant make a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea within thirty days of entry therefore does not 
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apply to pleas in abeyance.10 
In this case, the trial judge never explicitly stated 
that he accepted Kalmar's plea. Additionally, he did not comply 
with the Rule 11(e) requirements nor make the findings which are 
required prior to acceptance of a guilty plea. While the plea 
may not even have been "accepted" by the trial judge, its status 
as a plea in abeyance further defeats the application of section 
77-13-6(2) (b) since a plea in abeyance, by its very nature, is 
not "entered" until after the conclusion of the plea in abeyance 
agreement.X1 The plea in abeyance agreement contemplated that 
the plea would be withdrawn months after the plea proceeding. 
Hence, the plea in abeyance agreement reflected the statutory 
expectation that pleas in abeyance are "entered," if at all, 
after the conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement. Since 
Kalmar's no contest plea in abeyance was not "entered," the 
thirty-day limitation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) had not begun to 
run and the trial judge had the power to withdraw the plea in 
abeyance. 
10
 If the thirty-day limitation of section 77-13-6(2) (b) began 
to run at the plea proceeding for pleas in abeyance, commonly used 
plea in abeyance agreements could not be utilized. Ordinarily, a 
plea in abeyance agreement runs for a set period of time greater 
than thirty days, during which the defendant is required to meet 
certain conditions. 
11
 This is a proper grounds for affirmance regardless of 
whether it was raised below. See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149. The 
trial judge, believing he had jurisdiction to withdraw the plea, 
simply ordered that the plea be withdrawn without exploring the 
statutory bases for his power. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial judge correctly concluded that he had the 
authority to withdraw Kalmar's no contest plea in abeyance. That 
authority was based on three distinct grounds: (1) the thirty-
day limitation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) was not triggered since 
Kalmar was not informed of that limitation; (2) Rule 23, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a judge to arrest judgment at 
any time prior to imposition of sentence regardless of the 
thirty-day limitation in section 77-13-6(2)(b); and (3) the plea 
in abeyance was not "entered" and therefore the thirty-day 
limitation of section 77-13-6(2)(b) had not begun to run. 
Accordingly, Appellee Linda Kalmar respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the trial judge's order allowing her to 
withdraw her no contest plea in abeyance. 
SUBMITTED this L± day of c^jL7i 1 9 9 8 • 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 450 S. State, 5th Floor, P. 0. Box 140230, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 E. 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, 
this /xt* day of Q ^ L 1998. 
C-ahM 
'AN C. WATT 
DELIVERED copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Utah Attorney General's Office as indicated above this / day 
of :^/^0*7^<'1998. 
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ADDENDUM A 
LYNN R. BROWN, #0460 
Attomey for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
DE
^0.1 W7 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LINDA KALMAR, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT TO 
WITHDRAW NO CONTEST 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
Case no. 971900756FS 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
Pursuant to the defendants motion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that her plea in 
abeyance to a Class A Theft that was entered on September 15, 1997 is withdrawn. After 
reviewing the material and discussing the matter with Ernie Jones, Deputy District Attomey 
and defendants attomey, Lynn R. Brown, the Court on the motion of the defendant 
terminates the plea in abeyance and declines to enter judgement against her. 
DATED this _ ^ ^ = r ^ a r o r N o v e m b e r , 1997. 
HONORABL 
Third Distri 
3i 
ADDENDUM B 
Toiro «i-u c,a; Oisirici 
S c? 1 ^ 1SS7 
AGREEMENT FOR PLEA IN ABEYANCE / " 
/ / ( J A L f UAJ\5 COUNTY 
o v / ) ( n r '/ASt^ ^ •-.-
In accordance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code §77 
2a-2,3 SC 4. Linda Kalmar, by and through her attorney, Lynn R. Brown and the State by 
and through its attorney Ernie Jones and with the approval of this Court, enter into the 
following agreement for a plea in abeyance: 
1 • The defendant will enter a no contest plea to Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
2. At the time Linda Kalmar enters a no contest plea, the attorney for the State, 
Ernie Jones and the attorney for Linda Kalmar, Lynn R. Brown will move the Court to hold 
the plea in abeyance and not enter a judgment of conviction nor impose sentence pending 
the completion of this agreement. Linda Kalmar waives her right to have sentence imposed 
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
3. It is understood by the parties, that the issue to be resolved by this agreement 
and plea in abeyance is whether or not Linda Kalmar owes any restitution to her former 
employer, Cooks Books, for having deposited three checks into her personal checking account 
in the total amount of $1,530.28. 
4. To resolve the question of restitution, it is agreed that the Court may set a 
restitution hearing date and allow the parties at that time to present evidence to support their 
claims. 
5. If the Court determines at a restitution hearing that Linda Kalmar has money 
owing to her by Cooks Books in the amount of $1,530.28 or more then it is agreed that 
Mrs. Kalmar will pay no restitution to Cooks Books and the plea in abeyance may be 
withdrawn and the case dismissed by the Court, after at least 6 months has expired from the 
i\a 
date of the entry of the plea. 
6. If the Court determines at the restitution hearing that Linda Kalmar owes any 
amount to Cooks Books, then Mrs. Kalmar will be ordered to pay the determined amount 
within a specified time frame to be agreed upon by the parties. After completing the 
payment of restitution as ordered by the Court, the plea in abeyance may be withdrawn and 
the case dismissed. 
7. If at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, Linda Kalmar 
violated any conditions, the Court may order her appearance to show cause why the 
agreement should not be terminated. If it is determined after an evidentiary hearing that 
Mrs. Kalmar has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of this agreement, 
the Court may terminate the agreement and enter judgement and conviction and impose 
sentence against her for the offense to which the original plea was entered. 
This agreement entered into this (h day of September, 1997. 
LINDA KALMAR, Defendant 
pfrr*^-— K- f£t><5U~~ 
The terms and conditions as 
provided in this agreement, 
are approved by the Court 
LfiQN R. BROWN, Attorney for Defendant 
HONORABLE 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH Third iuclcial 0istrict 
St? 1 5 1397 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFEN ©AM^CSl 
"&,juLy Cleric 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER 
Case No. FS 
COMES NOW, /t/vs-dg £ihpta'Y' , the defendant in this case 
and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guiltVMQocontesjMo the following crime(s): 
CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION DEGREE PUNISHMENT 
'•la&iA 
B. 
C. 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, 
and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading 
(guijtyl (no contest) 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, 
that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1 . 1 know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I 
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, 
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
r: I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right 
to counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following 
reasons: 
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3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and 
understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
L\^ L / a r | d I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, 
my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that i have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense 
to testify in court upon by behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to 
do so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the 
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial 
is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted 
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal by conviction and 
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court 
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be 
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paid by the state. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to 
which I plead j^Jm^tno contest)/ I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an 
offense that carries Vnwrrlfnum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself 
to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the 
sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know 
that in addition to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) surcharge, required by Utah 
Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by 
the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11 . I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am 
on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I am waiving 
my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also 
know that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have 
committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) 
is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of (gutffy) {po contest) (te) (is not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions 
of this plea bargain, is any, are gully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this 
4 
affidavit. 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of (guilty) 
(no contest) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my 
plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession of recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing 
made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the court may do are also not binding on the court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the 
attached plea agreement, have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had i read to me by my attorney, and 
I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything 
contained in this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
19. I am fy^ years of age; I have attended school through the^A^ r^rade ' 
and I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which 
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impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any 
mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this j j ~ day of ^fj _ _ , 1 &?. 
DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for j^^j^ ^AgO/) , the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read 
it to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct 
are correctly stated ahd these, along with the other representations and declarations 
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
' /ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR # 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
Z**ds» /f6j02tfz?s> » defendant. I have reviewed this statement of 
the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of 
the charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or 
coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are 
fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as 
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that 
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which 
the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public 
interest. 
N 
^V- L ,Z^>^ 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR # 
7 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification 
of the defendant and counsel, the court witnesses the signatures and finds the 
defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so 
ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in 
the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this /£* day of <^f , 19 f"7-
DISTRlCFCOlIRT JtJbGE 
V , 
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ADDENDUM D 
SEPTEMBER 15, 1997 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: STATE VERSUS LINDA ANNETTE 
KALMAR. CASE NO. 971900756 FS. APPEARANCES, PLEASE. 
MR. BROWN: LYNN BROWN APPEARING ON BEHALF 
OF MS. KALMAR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. BROWN. AND FOR 
THE STATE? 
MR. JONES: EARNEST JONES FOR THE STATE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. MR. JONES. 
MR. BROWN: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE RESOLVED 
THIS MATTER WITH A PLEA TO A CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR. 
NO CONTEST. AND WE HAVE A PLEA IN ABEYANCE FORM OR 
AGREEMENT THAT WE NEED TO GO OVER WITH THE COURT. 
COULD WE DO THAT? 
THE COURT: I DON'T CARE MUCH FOR PLEAS IN 
ABEYANCE. WE HAVE JUST DONE IT LAST WEEK, AND I AM 
SURE IT'S A STATUTORY CONCEPT THAT HAS TO BE ALLOWED 
TO PARTIES, SO WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH IT. 
BUT THE STATUS OF THE FILE DURING THE 
PERIOD OF THE ABEYANCE, I DON'T WANT IT TO BE AN 
OPEN CASE. I WANT BE TO A CLOSED FILE, BECAUSE IT'S 
RESOLVED BY THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE, SO IT DOESN'T 
1 STAND AS A CASE PENDING FOR A YEAR ON THE CASE 
2 PENDING FILE. 
3 Q- (BY MR. BROWN) WELL, I ANTICIPATED IT TO 
4 BE-- WHAT WE WOULD WANT IS, THE ONLY ISSUE HERE IS A 
5 QUESTION OF WHO OWES WHO MONEYS. A QUESTION OF 
6 RESTITUTION. AFTER THE RESTITUTION HEARING, WE HAVE 
7 PROVIDED THAT IF SHE SHE OWES NO RESTITUTION, OR IF 
8 THEY OWE HER MONEY, THEN THE CASE IS TO BE 
9 DISMISSED. I THINK IT WILL BE --
10 THE COURT: SO WE NEED TO SET A RESTITUTION 
11 HEARING? 
12 MR. BROWN: THAT'S CORRECT? 
13 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. ARE YOU 
14 COMFORTABLE WITH THE AGREEMENT, THEN? 
15 MR. JONES: YES, I AM. AND WE HAVE GONE 
16 OVER THE AGREEMENT, JUDGE. IT'S SATISFACTORY. 
17 IT'S IN WRITING. LET ME, IF I COULD, JUST EXPLAIN 
18 TO THE COURT WHY WE'RE USING A PLEA IN ABEYANCE IN 
19 THIS CASE. 
20 THIS CASE OCCURRED IN AUGUST OF 1994. AND 
21 IT WAS NOT EVEN BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION FOR ALMOST 
22 A YEAR, SO WE STARTED DOING PROSECUTION OR THE 
23 INVESTIGATION IN '95. FOR SOME REASON SHE WAS NOT 
24 EVEN PICKED UP ON IT UNTIL MAY OF 1997, SO THE CASE 
25 IS RATHER OLD. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MOST OF THE WITNESSES 
WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM OUT OF 
WE HAVE 
STATE, 
CERTAINLY INCURS A REAL EXPENSE FOR US 
ON THE CASE 
WHICH 
THE 
RESTITUTION IN THIS CASE, AT LEAST FROM OUR 
STANDPOINT, IS AROUND $1,500. SO 
COMPARING THE COST OF PROSECUTION 
RESTITUTION, IT'S PROBABLY A FAIR 
MATTER. 
THE OTHER THING, IT'S 
DOES NOT HAVE A PRIOR CRIMINAL 
MY 
WHEN 
AND 
YOU START 
THE AMOUNT 
RESOLUTION OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
RECORD. SHE WAS 
OF 
THE 
SHE 
WORKING FOR A BOOK COMPANY, AND FROM OUR STANDPOINT, 
SHE TOOK SOME CHECKS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO 
THE COMPANY, AND INSTEAD KEPT THOSE AND CASHED 
THOSE. SO I THINK IT'S REALLY CASE OF POOR 
JUDGEMENT ON HER PART. 
THE COURT: WELL, THEN, WHY DO WE WANT 
TO - - WHY DON'T WE HAVE THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
FIRST AND THEN SEE WHAT WE DO WITH THE CASE? 
MR. JONES: WELL, I THINK SHE'S WILLING TO 
DO THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE SO WE GET THE ISSUES OF 
GUILT OR INNOCENCE OUT OF THE WAY. AND WE'LL JUST 
BRING IN THE EVIDENCE ON THE RESTITUTION TO 
DETERMINE HOW MUCH IF ANY IS OWING. 
THE COURT: BUT THE PLEA IS NO CONTEST. 
MR. JONES: NO CONTEST. THAT'S RIGHT. 
1 THE COURT: WHICH DOESN'T -- I MEAN, I WILL 
2 ACCEPT IT AS THOUGH IT WERE A GUILTY PLEA, BUT IT'S 
3 REALLY NOT A ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. SHE'S NOT - - AS I GET 
4 THE FEEL FOR THIS CASE, FOR WHATEVER THAT'S WORTH, 
5 MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE STATE IS NOT INTERESTED IN 
6 PROSECUTING HER. IF YOU WENT THROUGH THE EVIDENCE 
7 AND YOU FOUND OUT THAT, INDEED, THEY OWED HER MONEY, 
8 YOU WOULDN'T WANT TO PROSECUTE HER. 
9 MR. JONES: RIGHT. THAT'S WHY WE'RE 
10 WILLING --IF THE COURT DETERMINES THERE IS NO 
11 RESTITUTION OWING, I THINK WE ARE GOING TO 
12 ESSENTIALLY DISMISS THE CASE. SO I DON'T THINK 
13 THAT'S THE WAY IT'S GOING TO COME DOWN, BUT --
14 THE COURT: AND OF COURSE WE DON'T KNOW 
15 THAT. 
16 MR. JONES: RIGHT. 
17 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO 
18 HAVING THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING FIRST? 
19 MR. JONES: I JUST -- TO US, THE ONLY ISSUE 
20 IS RESTITUTION. HOW MUCH, IF ANY, IS OWING. AND WE 
21 THOUGHT BY DOING A PLEA IN ABEYANCE, WE COULD 
22 RESOLVE THAT AND JUST GET TO THE RESTITUTION 
23 QUESTION. 
24 THE COURT: AND I SUPPOSE THAT THERE ARE 
25 PROBLEMS WITH THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OR OTHER PROBLEMS 
ift 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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IN TERMS OF A RESTITUTION HEARING IF YOU HAVEN'T 
DEALT WITH THE PLEA. 
MR. JONES: RIGHT. THAT COULD BE, YES. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO YOU'RE 
COMFORTABLE WITH THIS AGREEMENT. 
MR. BROWN: THAT'S WHAT WE AGREED TO, YES 
THE COURT 
MS. KALMAR, DO YOU 
SREQUESTED HERE OF 
: OKAY. FINE. ALL RIGHT. 
UNDERSTAND WHAT'AS BEING 
THE COURT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
THE COURT : YOU'RE ASKING, THROUGH YOUR 
COUNSEL, THAT I AUTHORIZE YOU TO ENTER WHAT'S 
A PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
A PLEA TITLED "NO 
INTERPRETED BY ME , 
EVENT I LATER HAD 
IN OTHER i 
, WHICH MEANS THAT YOU WILL 
CONTEST", BUT IT WOULD BE 
AS AN ADMISSION OF OF GUILT 
CALLED 
ENTER 
IN THE 
TO REVIEW THIS FOR SOME REASON. 
WORDS, I COULD TREAT IT AS 
IT WERE A GUILTY PLEA WHEN IT'S A NO CONTEST 
I KNOW THAT SOUNDS 
MR. BROWN 
THE SAME FORCE AND 
DO THE SAME THING ' 
A BIT CONFUSING. 
: I EXPLAINED TO HER THAT 
EFFECT AS A GUILTY PLEA. 
THAT YOU COULD ON THIS AS A 
THOUGH 
PLEA. 
IT HAS 
YOU CAN 
GUILTY 
PLEA. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS, SHE DOESN'T ADMIT ANY 
CULPABILITY OR WRONG-DOING. 
THE COURT : RIGHT. SO WHAT SHE'S CLAIMING 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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IS THAT WHATEVER ERRORS WERE MADE WERE BOOKKEEPING 
PROBLEMS OR SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE. 
MR. BROWN: YEAH. WE'LL GET INTO THAT IN 
THE RESTITUTION HEARING. 
THE 
YOUR PLEA TO 
COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. IF I ACCEPT 
NO CONTEST ON THIS CASE, YOU'RE WAIVING 
ALL OF YOUR RIGHTS TO TRIAL. THAT MEANS THAT FROM 
THIS POINT ON, THERE WOULD BE NO TRIAL. THE STATE 
WOULD NOT BE 
AGAINST YOU, 
OBLIGATED TO CALL WITNESSES TO TESTIFY 
YOU WOULD WAIVE YOUR RIGHTS OF SILENCE, 
AND ACKNOWLEDGE AT LEAST WHAT HAPPENED HERE, SO THAT 
WE COULD GET TO THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING. DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT? 
THE 
PROVISO THAT 
THE 
MR. 
AT THAT TIME 
THE 
DEFENDANT: I UNDERSTAND THAT, WITH THE 
WE'LL HAVE THE RESTITUTION HEARING. 
COURT: YES. 
JONES: AND THAT I CAN OFFER EVIDENCE 
COURT: THAT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD. OKAY. 
HAVE YOU BEEN SATISFIED WITH THE ADVICE OF YOUR 
ATTORNEY, MR. 
THE 
THE 
1 INFLUENCE OF 
BROWN? 
DEFENDANT: YES. 
COURT: ARE YOU AT THIS TIME UNDER THE 
ANY DRUG, ALCOHOL, NARCOTIC, OR 
ANYTHING THAT WOULD IMPAIR YOUR JUDGMENT? 
THE DEFENDANT: COUPLE OF ASPIRIN. 
THE COURT: COUPLE OF ASPIRIN. DO THEY 
IMPAIR YOUR JUDGMENT? 
THE DEFENDANT: I DON'T THINK SO. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND DO YOU FEEL 
CAPABLE OF PROCEEDING? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN TO THE AMENDED 
INFORMATION, THEFT, A CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR -- ARE WE 
AMENDING THE AMOUNT, MR. JONES? 
MR. JONES: YES. 
MR. BROWN: I HAVE MADE IT AN INTENT. 
THE COURT: OKAY? 
MR. JONES: OKAY. 
THE COURT: INCHOATE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED 
THEFT, AND THEN THE AMOUNT STAYS? 
MR. BROWN: YES. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND THE PENALTY FOR A 
CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR MAY BE ONE YEAR IN THE COUNTY 
JAIL AND A FINE OF OF $2,500. DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
THAT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: TO THIS OFFENSE, DO YOU PLEAD 
GUILTY, NOT GUILTY, OR NO CONTEST? 
THE DEFENDANT: NO CONTEST. 
Ko 
1XL 
1 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HOW LONG WILL THE 
2 RESTITUTION HEARING TAKE, AND ARE YOU READY TO 
3 PROCEED WITH IT? 
4 MR. JONES: PROBABLY A COUPLE OF HOURS. 
5 MR. BROWN: IT COULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME. I 
6 I HAVE TO GET SOME OF THE RECORDS FROM THIS COMPANY, 
7 WHICH IS OUT OF STATE, SO --
8 THE COURT: YOU WANT SOME TIME TO SET IT. 
9 MR. BROWN: I WILL WANT SOME TIME. SOME 
10 TIME. PROBABLY ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. IF I 
11 COULD, TO DEAL WITH THAT. BECAUSE I'M GOING TO HAVE 
12 TO DIG UP SOME RECORDS AND OLD CHECKS FOR 
13 COMMISSIONS THAT THEY HAVE PAID TO .HER. SO I HAVE 
14 GOT TO DIG UP ALL THE FINANCIAL RECORDS. SO THAT 
15 COULD GO BACK A WHILE. 
16 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH 
17 THOSE DATES, MR. JONES? 
18 MR. JONES: NO. THAT'S FINE, YOUR HONOR. 
19 THE COURT: WHY DON'T WE SET IT FOR AN HOUR 
2 0 AND A HALF HEARING FOR NOVEMBER 6, AT 8:30. OKAY. 
21 ANY DIFFICULTY WITH WITH THAT, COUNSEL? 
2 2 MR. BROWN: IS THAT A FRIDAY? 
23 THE COURT: IT'S A THURSDAY MORNING AT 
24 8:30, AND I'M SETTING THIS SO THAT IT'S 8:30 TO TEN, 
2 5 BECAUSE TEN O'CLOCK WOULD BE MY TIME THAT I WOULD BE 
C"^ 
3JL 
ANTICIPATING BEGINNING A TRIAL. 
MR. BROWN: THAT SHOULD BE OKAY, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: I WILL APPRECIATE IT IF THIS 
MATTER, WHEN YOU GET ALL THE THE DATA AND THE 
RECORDS, IF YOU HAVE AN ABILITY TO STIPULATE, LET ME 
KNOW WELL IN ADVANCE OF THAT, SO THAT I CAN HAVE 
THAT TIME BACK. I DO HAVE A TRIAL SET THE DAY 
BEFORE, AND IF I COULD START THAT TRIAL EARLIER I 
WOULD. 
SO THERE IS GOING TO BE NO COMMUNICATION 
BETWEEN US BETWEEN NOW AND THE DATE OF THE 
RESTITUTION HEARING. NO PRETRIAL OR ANYTHING LIKE 
THAT. SO LET ME KNOW IN ADVANCE IF YOU CAN REACH AN 
AGREEMENT. 
MR. BROWN: SHALL WE EXECUTE THIS? 
THE COURT: YES. IF YOU WILL SIGN THE 
STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT. AND MR. BROWN, YOU 
STATED THAT YOU WANTED TO SAY SOMETHING MORE ABOUT 
THE FACTS AND ELEMENTS? 
MR. BROWN: YES. IF YOU'D LIKE ME TO. 
THE COURT: I THOUGHT YOU SAID YOU WERE 
GOING TO. 
MR. BROWN: THE ISSUE IS, SHE PUT IN HER 
RESIGNATION FOR THE EMPLOYMENT, AND AT THE TIME SHE 
^ 
l^-
1 PUT IN HER RESIGNATION SHE STILL HAD SOME MONEY 
2 COMING ON COMMISSIONS. SHE DIDN'T RECEIVE A SALARY; 
3 SHE GOT A PERCENTAGE OF ALL THE BOOK SALES. SHE 
4 MADE SIXTEEN PERCENT. AND THE RESIGNATION -- THE 
5 LETTER OF RESIGNATION WAS IN AUGUST OF '94, AND SO 
6 TERMINATED HER EMPLOYMENT AT THAT TIME. 
7 AND AFTER SHE TERMINATED HER EMPLOYMENT. 
8 CHECKS CAME TO HER DIRECTLY FROM THE PEOPLE THAT SHE 
9 SOLD THE BOOKS TO. SO SHE ENDORSED THE CHECKS AND 
10 DEPOSITED THEM IN HER BANK ACCOUNT. 
11 ACTUALLY, I THINK HER SISTER DID ON TWO OF 
12 THEM. BUT SHE FELT THAT SHE HAD THE MONEY COMING, 
13 AND THAT WAS THE ISSUE. 
14 THE COURT: I GUESS THAT WOULD BE BE OFFSET 
15 AGAINST THE 16 PERCENT OR 18 PERCENT. 
16 MR. BROWN: YES. 
17 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. THE RECORD 
18 MAY SHOW IN OPEN COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS SIGNED 
19 THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT AND THE COURT WILL 
20 ADD ITS SIGNATURE AS A WITNESS TO HERS. YOU WILL 
21 NOTE I HAVE GONE THROUGH AN ABBREVIATED COLLOQUY IN 
2 2 THIS CASE. 
23 JUST SO THAT EACH OF YOU UNDERSTAND, FOR 
24 THE COMPUTER'S PURPOSES, THIS CASE WILL BE DISMISSED 
25 UNDER A CATEGORY CALLED "OTHER," AND IT SIMPLY WILL 
1 BE DISMISSED AS OF THIS TIME. THAT DOESN'T MEAN 
2 IT'S RESOLVED, IT SIMPLY MEANS THAT FOR COMPUTER 
3 PURPOSES IT'S NOT AN ON-GOING, PENDING CASE. 
4 MR. BROWN: THANK YOU. 
5 THE COURT: OKAY. 
6 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
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ADDENDUM E 
_Li 
NOVEMBER 6, 1997 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
P R O C E E D I N G S . 
(COMMENCING AT 8:30 A.M.) 
THE COURT: GOOD MORNING. THIS IS THE TIME 
SET FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER THE STATE OF 
UTAH VERSUS LINDA ANETTE KALMAR, 971900756. THIS 
ISS TIME SET FOR A RESTITUTION HEARING. COUNSEL, 
FIRST, WILL YOU EACH STATE YOUR APPEARANCES. 
MR. BROWN: LYNN BROWN APPEARING ON BEHALF 
OF MS. KALMAR. 
MR. JONES: ERNEST JONES ON BEHALF OF THE 
STATE. 
THE COURT: WHAT'S ANTICIPATED TODAY? 
MR. BROWN: I GUESS WHEN WE TALKED ABOUT IT 
A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO, I GUESS WE DECIDED TO SET IT 
FOR A TRIAL. 
THE COURT: OKAY. LET'S MAKE A RECORD OF 
THE DISCUSSION, SO THAT WE HAVE FORMAL RECORD. THE 
RECORD SHOULD SHOW -- AND IF YOU HAVE A DIFFERENT 
RECOLLECTION, PLEASE HELP ME OR EXPAND UPON THE 
RECOLLECTION OF YOUR OWN INFORMATION -- THAT AT THE 
REQUEST, I THINK, OF MR. BROWN, BOTH THE PROSECUTOR 
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY MET WITH THE COURT A FEW DAYS 
AGO AND DISCUSSED AN ISSUE REGARDING THE DIFFICULTY 
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OF DETERMINING THE RESTITUTION. 
THE ISSUE WAS THAT APPARENTLY AT THE TIME 
THAT THE DEFENDANT ENTERED A NO CONTEST PLEA, WHICH 
WAS ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER, '97, THAT AT THAT TIME 
THE DEFENDANT, IT WAS ALLEGED BY THE COMPANY -- I 
THINK IT WAS A COMPANY CALLED COOK PUBLISHING. 
MR. BROWN: COOKS BOOKS. 
THE COURT: COOKS BOOKS. ANYWAY, A 
PUBLISHING COMPANY FOR WHICH SHE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
EMPLOYED, HAD INDICATED AND ALLEGED TO THE 
PROSECUTION THAT SHE HAD TAKEN IMPROPERLY SOME 
CHECKS AND DEPOSITED THEM TO HER ACCOUNT, AND IT WAS 
ABOUT $1,50 0. 
THERE WAS THEN A DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT SHE 
OWED THEM MONEY AND THEY OWED HER MONEY, THAT THERE 
WAS REALLY A NEED FOR AN ACCOUNTING. AND THAT WAS 
• THE ISSUE OF THE RESTITUTION. 
THE COMPANY THEN SENT SOME OTHER RECENT 
, CORRESPONDENCE THAT YOU HAD AND REFERRED TO AT THE 
TIME WE WERE MEETING IN MY CHAMBERS, AND INDICATED 
THAT IN FACT THE NET OBLIGATION AFTER THEY OFFSET 
THE COMMISSIONS THEY OWED HER AND THE MONEY THAT SHE 
OWED THEM, AND SO ON, WAS SOMETHING LIKE $687 
DOLLARS, IF I RECALL FROM THE DISCUSSION. 
MR. BROWN: THAT'S PRETTY CLOSE, YES. 
1 9 
1 THE COURT: IN ANY EVENT, TO CONTINUE THE 
2 DISCUSSION FURTHER, I EXPRESSED TO THE STATE THAT I 
3 HAD SOME SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ALLOWING THE 
4 PLEA TO STAND IF THIS WAS SIMPLY AN ACCOUNTING 
5 MATTER BETWEEN PARTIES AND NOT AND A CIVIL MATTER 
6 THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THE CIVIL COURT BECAUSE 
7 YOU FEEL THAT THERE IN FACT WAS A CLASS A. 
8 MISDEMEANOR TO WHICH SHE PLED. 
9 IN FACT, I THOUGHT IT WAS A THIRD DEGREE 
10 FELONY, BUT I SEE NOW IN MY INFORMATION SHE PLED TO 
11 AN ATTEMPTED THEFT. WHICH IS A CLASS A. THAT EVEN 
12 SO, I WOULD NOT BE INCLINED, AS I RECALL OUR 
13 DISCUSSION, TO PUT SOMEBODY IN THE STATE PRISON FOR 
14 ZERO TO FIVE ON SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE. THAT WAS OUR 
15 DISCUSSION. 
16 AT THAT POINT I THINK, MR. BROWN, YOU 
17 INDICATED THAT PERHAPS YOUR CLIENT WOULD WANT TO TO 
18 WITHDRAW THE PLEA, AND WE WOULD THEN SET IT FOR 
19 TRIAL. 
2 0 NOW, IS THAT A AN ACCURATE REPRESENTATION 
21 OF OUR DISCUSSION? 
22 MR. BROWN: I THINK THAT'S FAIRLY ACCURATE. 
23 THE COURT: MR. JONES? 
24 MR. JONES: I THINK THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR 
2 5 HONOR. 
2_Q_ 
1 THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT EITHER 
2 OF YOU WISH TO ADD TO THE RECORD? 
3 MR. BROWN: NO. 
4 MR. JONES: THERE IS. AND THAT IS, I JUST 
5 DON'T THINK AT THIS POINT IN TIME AT THAT THE 
6 DEFENDANT CAN WITHDRAW THE PLEA. AS YOU HAVE 
7 ALREADY POINTED OUT, SHE ENTERED A NO CONTEST PLEA 
8 ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER. WE'RE ALMOST TWO MONTHS 
9 BEYOND THAT POINT NOW ON THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER. IF I 
10 READ THE STATUTE CORRECTLY, 77-13-6, SHE HAS TO MAKE 
11 A REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THAT PLEA, AND I BELIEVE IT 
12 HAS TO DONE WITHIN 3 0 DAYS FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN. 
13 THERE IS A CASE CALLED STATE VERSUS PRICE, 
14 837 PACIFIC 2D, 578. I THINK ONCE THE 30 DAYS IS UP 
15 SHE CANNOT WITHDRAW THE PLEA. SO I WOULD SIMPLY ASK 
16 THE COURT TO DENY THE REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA 
17 AT THIS POINT. 
18 THE COURT: IS IT YOUR REQUEST TO WITHDRAW 
19 THE PLEA? 
20 MR. BROWN: WELL, I'M A LITTLE SURPRISED. 
21 BECAUSE I THINK LAST TIME WHEN WE WERE DISCUSSING IT 
22 MR. JONES SAID, "WELL, LET'S JUST SET IT FOR TRIAL." 
23 SO I DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS GOING TO BE ANY 
24 PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO THAT. 
25 THE COURT: I SEE. 
2JL 
1 MR. BROWN: BUT AS I INDICATED TO THE 
2 COURT, THE INFORMATION THAT WE RECEIVED MAKES IT 
3 VERY CLEAR TO ME THAT THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL INTENT 
4 INVOLVED HERE. AND IT'S SIMPLY A MATTER THAT SHOULD 
5 HAVE BEEN LITIGATED IN THE CIVIL COURTS. 
6 IF THE COURT'S NOT INCLINED TO TAKE THE 
7 WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA, I GUESS WE'LL HAVE TO DEAL 
8 WITH THAT. 
9 THE COURT: I CERTAINLY HAVEN'T READ THIS 
10 RECENT CASE. I DO KNOW WHEN WE ADVISE PEOPLE THAT 
11 GO THROUGH THE COLLOQUY OF A PLEA THAT WE DO 
12 INDICATE THAT THEY CAN WITHDRAW THEIR PLEA ANY TIME 
13 WITHIN 30 DAYS. 
14 I WILL TELL YOU THAT IF YOU FILE A MOTION 
15 TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA, I BELIEVE THERE'S GOOD CAUSE 
16 FOR ALLOWING THE PLEA TO BE WITHDRAWN. 
17 MR. BROWN: I DIDN'T KNOW THERE WAS GOING 
18 TO BE ANY ISSUE ABOUT THAT. 
19 THE COURT: THEN THE COURT WILL AUTHORIZE 
2 0 THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA, AND DENY THE OBJECTION 
2 1 OF THE STATE. SO THAT PLEA IS WITHDRAWN AND 
22 STRICKEN IN THIS CASE. NOW, I ASSUME THAT TAKES US 
23 BACK, FOR TECHNICAL REASONS, BACK TO THE THEFT, A 
24 THIRD DEGREE FELONY WHICH WAS THE ORIGINAL CHARGE IN 
25 THE INFORMATION. 
MR. 
ARE GOING TO 
SUGGEST THAT 
WOULD SET IT 
JONES: 
ALLOW 
RATHER 
IN LIGHT OF YOUR RULING, 
HER TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA, 
THAN SET IT FOR TRIAL 
OVER FOR 3 0 DAYS TO GIVE ME 
OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT WE 
APPEAL THE COURT'S 
THE 
MR. 
THE STATE TO 
COURT: 
JONES: 
APPEAL 
I THINK RATHER THAN 
RULING. 
ALL RIGHT. 
., IF 
AN 
22 
IF YOU 
I WOULD 
YOU 
, WANT TO 
I DO THINK THE STATUTE ALLOWS 
THAT PARTICULAR PROVISION 
SETTING IT FOR TRIAL, 
LIKE SOME TIME TO THE LOOK AT THAT. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
OBJECTION TO 
HAVE ALREADY 
COURT: 
BROWN: 
COURT: 
OKAY. ANY OBJECTION 
NO. 
OKAY. I DON'T HAVE 
THAT EITHER. LET ME PUT IT 
BUT 
I WOULD 
• TO 
ANY 
THIS 
THAT? 
WAY : I 
INDICATED TO YOU WHAT I AM INCLINED TO 
DO. I DID THAT IN 
LITTLE CONCERNED AS 
LAW ADEQUATELY FOR 
YOU BRING UP 
TO THIS CASE 
MR. 
THE 
RECENTLY, 
MR. 
MY CHAMBERS EARLIER, AND I 
TO WHETHER WE FLESHED 
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
YOUR ARGUMENT AT THAT POINT 
AS 837 
JONES: 
COURT: 
JONES: 
PAC. 2D 578, I THINK 
YES . 
OUT 
MR. 
' M A 
THE 
JONES, 
REFERRING 
YOU 
WHICH OF COURSE I HAVEN' 
IF YOU WANT TO TAKE 
SAID. 
T READ 
IT UNDER 
2 3 
ADVISEMENT --
THE COURT: I REALLY DON'T. I'M GOING TO 
RULE THIS WAY, BUT I AM JUST WONDERING IF YOU WANT 
TO FLESH IT OUT BY ANY OTHER PLEADINGS. 
IF YOU WANT, MR. BROWN, TO FILE A MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW THE PLEA, OR IF YOU'RE SATISFIED WITH 
RECORD, I'M SATISFIED WITH THE DISCUSSION THAT 
THAT I'M NOT COMFORTABLE ACCEPTING A PLEA. IT 
THE 
I HAD 
WAS A 
NO CONTEST PLEA; IT WAS NOT AN ADMISSION OF GUILT, 
AND I'M JUST NOT GOING TO BE HAPPY WITH A PLEA 
THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
UNDER 
I FIRST THOUGHT THAT SHE HAD -- BASICALLY 
THE CHARGE MAY HAVE BEEN -- EVEN BEEN A LITTLE 
INNACURATE IN THE SENSE THAT IT WAS CHARGED AS A 
THEFT, WHEN IN FACT IT PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
CHARGED AS EMBEZZLING, I SUPPOSE. SHE HAD THE 
LAWFUL RIGHT TO HAVE THE CHECKS WHICH SHE DEPOSITED 
INTO HER ACCOUNT. 
AND THEN THERE WAS THIS OFF-SETTING 
SITUATION. SO I DON'T KNOW. THE CASE IS JUST 
UNCOMFORTABLE CASE FOR ME. I'M NOT WILLING TO 
AN 
SEND 
SOMEBODY TO PRISON AND ALLOW THE POTENTIAL THAT THEY 
WILL GO TO PRISON ON THE BASIS OF THE RECORD I 
HAVE . 
KNOW 
THAT MEANS THAT BOTH OF YOU MAY DISCOVER 
AND GIVE 
PLEA IS 
CONSIDER 
ZA_ 
ME OTHER INFORMATION HEREAFTER. SO THE 
WITHDRAWN. 
WHETHER TO 
MEAN THAT TODAY IS 
ABOUT YOU FILE YOUR 
DECEMBER 
APPEAL, 
FRIDAY. 
DECEMBER 
5TH, WHICH 
WHICH IS A 
I'LL GIVE YOU 3 0 DAYS TO 
APPEAL THE MATTER. THAT WOULD , 
THE 6TH ARE NOVEMBER, SO HOW 
NOTICE OF READINESS ON OR BEFORE 
IS A FRIDAY. OR NOTICE OF 
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, WHICH IS A 
SHALL WE NOW SET THE CASE FOR REVIEW ON 
8 SO THAT 
FILING SYSTEM? 
CALENDAR 
MORNING. 
MR. BROWN: 
•? 
THE COURT: 
DECEMBER 
WE DON'T LET IT GET LOST IN THE 
IS THAT ON YOUR REGULAR 
A SIMPLE REVIEW ON MONDAY 
8. AND IF THE CASE IS GOING TO 
GO FURTHER, BE RETURNED BACK FOR FOR TRIAL, WE'LL 
SET THE 
RESOLVE 
PRETRIAL AND TRIAL AT THAT TIME, OR WE'LL 
IT, HOWEVER 
MR. JONES: 
CITED WAS 77-13-6. 
CONSIDER 
RECESS. 
THE COURT: 
THIS CASE 
MR. BROWN: 
THE COURT: 
YOU DETERMINE. 
THE SECTION OF THE CODE THAT I 
TALKS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA. 
OKAY. ALL RIGHT. WELL, I WILL 
NEXT ON DECEMBER 8 FOR REVIEW. 
THANKS, JUDGE. 
THANK YOU EACH. THE COURT'S IN 
WILL YOU PREPARE AN ORDER, MR. BROWN, 
_ _ _ 2_5_ 
1 | WITHDRAWING THE PLEA, DOING WHAT I HAVE JUST SAID 
2 TODAY. 
3 MR. BROWN: YES. 
4 THE COURT: OKAY. 
5 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AND COURT IN RECESS 
6 AT 8:50 A.M.) 
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ADDENDUM F 
SENATE BILL 81 
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA AMENDMENTS 
SENATE DEBATE 
JANUARY 24, 1989 
Sen. Carling: Mr. President. At the present time, there is 
no limitation on when a person can withdraw a 
guilty plea. The courts and prosecutors have 
indicated this has happened sometimes even 
after four and five years after a person has 
entered a guilty plea when there's no way to 
come back and retry their case after the 
evidence is gone. In order to be fair to 
both the defendant and to the state, this 
bill has been presented which would indicate 
that a person may withdraw their guilty plea 
only within 3 0 days after they entered that 
plea and there has been a final disposition 
or, and also requires at the time that the 
person makes their plea that the court be 
advised that he has 3 0 days to withdraw that 
guilty plea or that right would be withdrawn. 
There was no opposition from either side in 
the committee hearings in this matter. We do 
need to have one amendment, if there's no 
questions, to add to the bill. Mr. Chairman, 
I see no question. I would, we passed out an 
amendment on the buff copy. This is a law 
which also amends the Utah Rules of 
Procedure, and in amending Rules of 
Procedure, it takes a two-thirds vote of the 
body. This language incorporates the fact 
that we are amending the Rules of Procedure 
as well as the law. I would move the 
adoption of the amendments that have been 
passed out in regards to Rules of Procedure. 
HOUSE DEBATE 
Mr. Speaker: 
Reading Clerk: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Cuttle: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Cuttle: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Senate Bill 81. Madam Reading Clerk. 
Senate Bill 81, Withdrawal of Guilty Plea 
Amendments by Senator Richard J. Carling. Be 
it enacted by the Legislature of the State of 
Utah. 
Representative Cuttle. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. This bill comes to 
us from the state-wide association of 
prosecutors and the issue here is a 3 0-day 
retraction of a guilty plea. Sometimes 
people are sentenced to jail and they plead 
guilty, then they go to jail, and then they 
wait a long time and they send a lot of 
motions and then they come back and withdraw 
the plea. And so this puts a 3 0-day time 
limit on it. Most of these complaints are 
from the prison down at the point of the 
mountain. Sometimes they've gone as long as 
four to five years before they withdrew the 
guilty plea, and then that has been sent to 
the court of appeals and they've overruled 
it. So this is just streamline it and get it 
back where everything's fair and a speedy 
trial. 
Is there discussion to Senate Bill 81? I see 
no lights, Representative. I'll return to 
you for sum-up. 
Waive sum-up. 
Summation's waived. Voting's open on Senate 
Bill 81. 
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